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 The Forgotten Right: Section 9 of the 
Charter, Its Purpose and Meaning 
James Stribopoulos 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ask anyone familiar with criminal procedure in Canada to name a 
seminal judgment on section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms1 (“the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure”), 
and most will undoubtedly respond Hunter v. Southam.2 Alternatively, 
some might suggest R. v. Collins.3 Either way, virtually everyone you 
ask will have little difficulty identifying at least one, and probably more, 
important Supreme Court of Canada decisions on section 8. Ask that 
same question about section 9 (“the right not to be arbitrarily detained or 
imprisoned”) and compare the results. Chances are most people you ask 
will struggle to name a single Supreme Court judgment involving section 9, 
let alone identify a standout. 
Unlike section 8 of the Charter, there is no ready parallel to section 
9 found in the U.S. Bill of Rights.4 Given an abundance of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence relating to search and seizure,5 the Supreme 
                                                                                                            

 Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School (jstribopoulos@osgoode.yorku.ca). An 
earlier draft of this paper was presented at The National Conference on the Charter and Criminal 
Justice in Toronto, September 2007. The paper benefited from discussions I had with my co-panellists 
leading up to and at the conference, Professor Stephen Coughlan, Justice Maureen Forestell, and 
Justice Casey Hill. A debt of gratitude is also owed to Maija Martin, my very capable research 
assistant. Of course, any errors are mine alone. 
1
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
2 
Canada (Combines Investigation Act, Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam 
Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.) (hereinafter “Hunter v. Southam”). 
3 
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.). 
4 
U.S. Const. amend. I-X. 
5 
U.S. Const. amend. IV (“Fourth Amendment”). The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
In the United States the Fourth Amendment has also been the basis for judicial efforts to 
constitutionally regulate stops and arrests. In particular, the language that confers the “right of the 
people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures” extends constitutional 
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Court of Canada was provided with a crystal ball with which to forecast 
the implications of taking a variety of different paths under section 8. 
With the benefit of the American experience the Court acted quickly to 
identify the protection of reasonable privacy expectations as the sine qua 
non of that constitutional guarantee.6 Soon after, the Court set down an 
analytical framework for the adjudication of constitutional claims under 
section 8.7 The result was that early in the Charter’s history the stage 
was set for a very constructive dialogue between the Court and Parliament 
on the subject of police search and seizure powers.8 
The Supreme Court has dealt with section 9 of the Charter on a 
number of occasions over the past 25 years. Nevertheless, its jurisprudence 
involving the guarantee has been marked by extraordinary restraint. 
Although the Court has supplied some guidance on when a law authorizing 
detention or imprisonment will run afoul of section 9, it has steered 
clear of explaining the larger purpose of the section or addressing in any 
meaningful way the far more common question: when should an individual 
police officer’s decision to detain or arrest be characterized as having been 
made “arbitrarily”? 
Not surprisingly, uncertainty about the purpose and meaning of 
section 9 has had significant negative consequences. Absent a theoretical 
framework to guide developments in this important area, many cases are 
marked by a pronounced reluctance to characterize anything but the 
most coercive encounters as resulting in a “detention”. By refraining 
from finding a “detention”, courts avoid the need to grapple with the 
equally thorny question of whether an encounter between an individual 
and the police runs afoul of the Charter guarantee because it took place 
“arbitrarily”. 
                                                                                                            
protection to so-called “seizures of the person”, i.e. stops and arrests. Arrests have been held to 
require probable cause to justify them (see, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 at 103 (1959)), 
whereas investigative stops simply require reasonable suspicion (see, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
at 23-24, 27, 30, 32-33 (1968)). 
6 
See Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 159 (S.C.C.) 
wherein the Supreme Court of Canada relied upon the seminal decision of the U.S. Supreme Court 
on the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
7 
In R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at 278 (S.C.C.), the Supreme 
Court explained that a “search will be reasonable if it is authorized by law, if the law itself is 
reasonable and if the manner in which the search was carried out is reasonable”. See also R. v. 
Evans, [1996] S.C.J. No. 1, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, at 22 (S.C.C.). 
8 
On the dialogue that emerged with respect to search and seizure, albeit briefly, see generally 
James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the Charter” 
(2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1, at 61-73. See also Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism 
or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), at 176-79; and Kent Roach, “American 
Constitutional Theory for Canadians (and the Rest of the World)” (2002) 52 U.T.L.J. 503, at 518-23. 
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The other unfortunate development that is very likely connected to a 
stagnant section 9 jurisprudence is the rise of judicially created detention 
powers. During the same period that legislative reform was resulting in 
more clearly defined search and seizure powers, the law relating to police 
detention practices became steeped in increased confusion. Without robust 
section 9 jurisprudence, Parliament was not provided with any real 
incentive to redress substantial gaps in the formal detention powers 
possessed by police. Unlike with search and seizure, a dialogue between 
the courts and Parliament never took place on the subject of police 
detention powers. 
In the absence of legislative intervention, however, the courts came 
under increased pressure to make up for considerable shortcomings in 
the lawful authority possessed by police to carry out detentions. The 
Supreme Court responded to that pressure by transforming an obscure 
English precedent into a device for the judicial recognition of new 
“ancillary” police powers at “common law”.9 Initially, this allowed a 
slim majority of the Supreme Court to recognize a power on the part of 
police to carry out roadblock stops to check on driver sobriety.10 This 
was eventually followed by a police power to detain for investigative 
purposes11 and, most recently, just this past year, a power to conduct 
roadblock stops to further criminal investigative ends.12 
                                                                                                            
9
 In R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court 
relied on a two-part test developed by the English Court of Criminal Appeal for a rather different 
purpose. See R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659, [1964] 1 Q.B. 164 (C.A.), which recognized a 
two-part test which was intended to be used for determining whether a police officer, whom the 
accused in that case were charged with obstructing, was acting “in the execution of his duty” — an 
essential ingredient of the offence charged in that case. The transformation of that test by the 
Supreme Court of Canada into means by which to recognize new police powers has met with 
considerable criticism. See Patrick Healy, “Investigative Detention in Canada” [2005] Crim. L. 
Rev. 98, at 103-107; Tim Quigley, “Brief Investigatory Detentions: A Critique of R. v. Simpson” 
(2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 935, at 939; James Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment? Investigative Detention: 
Ten Years Later” (2003) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 335, at 348-52; James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: 
The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1, at 18-30. 
10
 R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.). 
11
 This power was first recognized in R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 
482 (Ont. C.A.). Virtually every appellate court in the country then followed that judgment before 
the Supreme Court of Canada finally endorsed the investigative detention power. See R. v. Mann, 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.). For a critical evaluation of Mann based, in part, 
on the uncertainty that it has served to create, see James Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially 
Created Police Powers: Investigative Detention After Mann” (2007) 45 Crim. L.Q. 299. For a 
consideration of the many gaps left by the judgment along with suggestions as to how to fill them, 
see Michal Fairburn, “Mann Oh Man — We’ve Only Just Begun” (2005) 17 N.J.C.L. 171. 
12 
See R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.). 
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While the Supreme Court has been busy creating new legal powers 
by which to justify state interferences with individual liberty, it has said 
virtually nothing about the purpose behind section 9. Similarly, the 
Supreme Court has been noticeably coy on the question of what 
constitutional implications might flow should the authorities fail to abide 
by the rather uncertain limits the Court has articulated with respect to 
the “common law” detention powers that it has recently created. 
This paper will attempt to do what the jurisprudence has so far 
managed to avoid: identify both the purpose and meaning of section 9  
of the Charter. This is an essential first step in any effort to achieve 
meaningful constitutional protection for what is arguably the most 
fundamental right of all: individual liberty. 
By drawing on a variety of sources, Part II will attempt to reveal the 
purpose and meaning of section 9 of the Charter. Part III will revisit the 
key threshold requirement for triggering the guarantee: a “detention”. 
An “imprisonment” can also engage the provision, but as will be explained 
below, its meaning is far from controversial.13 Case law interpreting and 
applying the “detention” requirement will be closely scrutinized in an 
effort to evaluate how well the jurisprudence coincides with the purpose 
of the guarantee. 
II. THE PURPOSE AND MEANING OF SECTION 914 
Section 9 of the Charter provides that “[e]veryone has the right not to 
be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned.” Over the last 25 years the Supreme 
Court of Canada has never expressly taken up the challenge of identifying 
the purpose of the guarantee or supplying anything more than a partial 
sense of its potential meaning. The Court’s rather restrained approach 
toward section 9 is apparent in even the most superficial quantitative 
analysis of its cases involving the guarantee. 
Section 9 has been raised before the Supreme Court in 24 separate 
cases.15 In eight of these the Court resolved the case on some other bases 
                                                                                                            
13 
See Part III, The Effect of Reading “Detention” Purposively.  
14 
This part of the paper expands on ideas first explored elsewhere. See James Stribopoulos, 
“Unchecked Power: The Constitutional Regulation of Arrest Reconsidered” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 225,  
at 264-73. 
15 
I include in this category those cases in which a litigant relied on s. 9 in advancing the 
merits of their position on appeal or where the Court addressed the guarantee in any substantive 
way. See R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.) (challenging the use of 
an investigative roadblock by police); Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 
S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.) (challenging the security certificate scheme); R. v. Chaisson, 
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and thereby avoided any meaningful consideration of section 9.16 Of the 
                                                                                                            
[2006] S.C.J. No. 11, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 415 (S.C.C.) (restoring an acquittal ordered by the trial judge 
who found a violation of ss. 8, 9 and 10(b)); R. v. Decorte, [2004] S.C.J. No. 77, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 133 
(S.C.C.) (challenging the RIDE program carried out on a Native reserve); R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. 
No. 49, 2004 SCC 52 (S.C.C.) (noting that investigative detentions carried out in accordance with 
the common law power recognized in this case would not violate s. 9); R. v. Latimer, [1997] S.C.J. 
No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.) (challenging the appellant’s arrest); R. v. Jacques, [1996] 
S.C.J. No. 88, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 312 (S.C.C.) (challenging the detention of the appellant to 
investigate suspected smuggling); R. v. Montour, [1995] S.C.J. No. 48, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 416 (S.C.C.)  
(a one-paragraph judgment restoring the appellant’s acquittal at trial following the exclusion of evidence 
as a result of a s. 9 violation); R. v. Simpson, [1995] S.C.J. No. 12, 95 C.C.C. (3d) 96 (S.C.C.) 
(challenging the reversal of a stay ordered at trial due to a delay in bringing the appellant to court 
for a bail hearing, s. 9 violation conceded — the only issue was the appropriateness of a stay); R. v. 
Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.) (challenging the offence of vagrancy 
by loitering near playgrounds); R. v. Macooh, [1993] S.C.J. No. 28, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 802 (S.C.C.) 
(challenging the appellant’s detention and arrest); R. v. Morales, [1992] S.C.J. No. 98, [1992]  
3 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.) (challenging the public safety and public interest bases for denying bail); R. v. 
Mellenthin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 100, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615 (S.C.C.) (challenging a search that took 
place incidental to a RIDE stop); R. v. Pearson, [1992] S.C.J. No. 99, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665 (S.C.C.) 
(challenging the reversal of the burden on bail hearings for drug offences); R. v. Swain, [1991] 
S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (S.C.C.) (challenging the automatic committal to custody of 
those found not guilty by reason of insanity); R. v. Wilson, [1990] S.C.J. No. 54, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 
1291 (S.C.C.) (challenging a vehicle stop); R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 
(S.C.C.) (challenging the constitutionality of roving and random stops under the authority of  
s. 189(a)(1) of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 198); R. v. Luxton, [1990] S.C.J. 
No. 87, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.) (challenging the mandatory minimum sentence for murder); 
R. v. Storrey, [1990] S.C.J. No. 12, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241 (S.C.C.) (challenging the delay in bringing 
the appellant to court following his arrest); R. v. Duguay, [1989] S.C.J. No. 4, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 93 
(S.C.C.) (s. 9 violation conceded by Crown, the only issue was the remedy); R. v. Beare, [1987] 
S.C.J. No. 92, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 57 (S.C.C.) (challenging the fingerprinting of persons charged or 
arrested); R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.) (challenging the 
provision in Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act that authorized police to stop motorists in the context of 
a fixed RIDE checkstop); R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.) 
(challenging the mandatory minimum sentence for importing a narcotic); R. v. Milne, [1987] S.C.J. 
No. 73, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 512 (S.C.C.) (challenging the continued detention as a dangerous offender where 
the index offence has since been repealed); R. v. Lyons, [1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 
(S.C.C.) (challenging the imposition of indeterminate sentences of imprisonment under the dangerous 
offender regime). 
16 
See R. v. Chaisson, [2006] S.C.J. No. 11, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 415 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Montour, 
[1995] S.C.J. No. 48, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 416 (S.C.C.) (both cases restored acquittals ordered by trial 
judges who found violations of s. 9, the bases for both decisions was the appellate court’s failure to 
show sufficient deference to the trial judge’s findings); R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 
52 (S.C.C.) (s. 9 not discussed, case resolved based on violation of s. 8); R. v. Simpson, [1995] 
S.C.J. No. 12, 95 C.C.C. (3d) 96 (S.C.C.) (a violation of s. 9 was conceded; the only issue was the 
appellate court’s decision to overturn a stay ordered by the trial judge); R. v. Heywood, [1994] 
S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.) (the majority found the offence of vagrancy by 
loitering near playgrounds unconstitutional under s. 7 and did not address s. 9); R. v. Mellenthin, 
[1992] S.C.J. No. 100, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615 (S.C.C.) (case resolved based on a violation of s. 8);  
R. v. Duguay, [1989] S.C.J. No. 4, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 93 (S.C.C.) (s. 9 violation conceded, analysis 
turns exclusively on remedy); R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.) 
(minimum sentence for importing narcotics found to violate s. 12, s. 9 not discussed). 
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remaining 16 cases, in 12 the Court found no violation.17 In two cases 
the Court concluded that the impugned provision was contrary to section 9 
but upheld the violations as reasonable limits under section 1.18 The 
Court concluded that section 9 was violated in only two cases. Both 
decisions involved challenges to legislation that the Court concluded 
authorized arbitrary detentions that could not be justified under section 1.19 
Although the numbers provide some evidence to suggest that the 
Court’s approach to section 9 can be best described as conservative, they 
tell only a small part of the story. A better understanding of the limitations 
in the section 9 jurisprudence requires examining the types of cases in 
which such claims have been raised and what the Court has had to say 
about the purpose and meaning of the guarantee on these occasions. 
Claims under section 9 of the Charter that have made their way 
before the Supreme Court have generally taken one of two forms. First, 
the guarantee has been used to challenge the constitutionality of a wide 
array of legislation that authorizes detention or imprisonment. These 
cases have ranged from attacks upon provincial laws that authorize the 
police to stop motorists at organized checkpoints and through roving 
and random stops,20 to challenges directed at Criminal Code21 provisions 
                                                                                                            
17
 See R. v. Decorte, [2004] S.C.J. No. 77, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 133 (S.C.C.); R. v. Latimer, 
[1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 21 (S.C.C.); R. v. Jacques, [1996] S.C.J. No. 88, [1996]  
3 S.C.R. 312 (S.C.C.); R. v. Macooh, [1993] S.C.J. No. 28, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 802 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Morales, [1992] S.C.J. No. 98, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.) (although a s. 9 challenge to the public 
safety ground for denying bail was rejected, the public interest ground was invalidated for being 
inconsistent with s. 11(e)); R. v. Pearson, [1992] S.C.J. No. 99, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Wilson, [1990] S.C.J. No. 54, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1291 (S.C.C.); R. v. Luxton, [1990] S.C.J. No. 87, 
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.); R. v. Storrey, [1990] S.C.J. No. 12, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241 (S.C.C.);  
R. v. Beare, [1987] S.C.J. No. 92, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 57 (S.C.C.); R. v. Milne, [1987] S.C.J. No. 73, 
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 512 (S.C.C.); R. v. Beare, [1987] S.C.J. No. 92, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 57 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Lyons, [1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.).  
18
 See R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Ladouceur, 
[1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 (S.C.C.) (both cases involved a challenge to s. 189(a)(1) of 
the Ontario Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 198, the provision which authorized police to stop 
motorists but which did not specify any criteria to govern the exercise of this discretion). In Hufsky, 
the Court concluded that the section violated s. 9 but upheld the violation under s. 1 in a case where 
police were carrying out a fixed roadblock sobriety checkstop under the authority of s. 189(a)(1). In 
Ladouceur, the Court upheld the use of s. 189(a)(1) for the purpose of roving and random vehicle 
stops, provided that the police limited their inquiries to motor vehicle concerns, i.e., driver sobriety, 
licensing, insurance and the mechanical fitness of the vehicle.  
19
 See Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007]  
1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.) (the statutory provision barring those subject to security certificates from 
seeking judicial review for at least 120 days violated s. 9); R. v. Swain, [1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 
1 S.C.R. 933 (S.C.C.) (the automatic committal to custody of those found not guilty by reason of 
insanity violated s. 9). 
20
 See R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.); R. v. Ladouceur, 
[1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Wilson, [1990] S.C.J. No. 54, [1990] 
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that allow for the indefinite imprisonment of persons designated as 
dangerous offenders.22 In these cases it has usually been the presence of 
too little or too much discretion in the statutory authority conferred which 
has proven determinative. Legislation that mandates a loss of liberty 
without the need to consider any rational criteria or standards has been 
held to operate “arbitrarily”.23 The Supreme Court has rightly recognized 
that “it is the absence of discretion which would, in many cases, render 
arbitrary the law’s application.”24 At the same time, the Court has found 
legislation at odds with section 9 of the Charter when it confers unfettered 
discretion on state agents to detain individuals. In such circumstances, 
“[a] discretion is arbitrary . . . [because] . . . there are no criteria, express 
or implied, which govern its exercise.”25 
                                                                                                            
1 S.C.R. 1291 (S.C.C.). In these cases provincial legislation authorizing police to stop motorists 
was found to be inconsistent with s. 9 as it did not provide any criteria to guide police in deciding 
whom to stop, effectively granting unfettered discretion. But after citing statistical evidence 
documenting the catastrophic effect of impaired and unlicensed drivers, the Court upheld the power 
to conduct organized check-stops and random roving stops as reasonable limits in a free and 
democratic society under s. 1. However, such stops are only permissible under s. 1 if their purpose 
is limited to checking licences, insurance, driver sobriety and the mechanical fitness of vehicles. 
Any probing beyond these limited purposes is, in theory, prohibited (see R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] 
S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257, at 1287 (S.C.C.); R. v. Mellenthin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 100, 
[1992] 3 S.C.R. 615, at 628 (S.C.C.)), and may transform a stop from an encounter which was 
constitutionally permissible at its inception into an arbitrary detention. But see Brown v. Durham 
(Regional Municipality) Police Force, [1998] O.J. No. 5274, 131 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 16-17 (Ont. C.A.) 
(holding that an ulterior motivation for such a stop, for instance, the pursuit of other investigative 
interests, does not automatically render the detention arbitrary provided that the ulterior purpose is 
not itself unconstitutional — for instance, a stop undertaken for the purpose of effecting an 
unconstitutional search). Also see R. v. Duncanson, [1991] S.J. No. 373, 12 C.R. (4th) 86 (Sask. C.A.), 
revd [1992] S.C.J. No. 31, 12 C.R. (4th) 98 (S.C.C.) (without addressing this issue). But see R. v. 
Guenette, [1999] J.Q. no 760, 136 C.C.C. (3d) 311 (Que. C.A.). 
21
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
22
 See R. v. Milne, [1987] S.C.J. No. 73, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 512 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Lyons, 
[1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.) (upholding the dangerous offender scheme 
because it “narrowly defines a class of offenders with respect to whom it may properly be invoked, 
and prescribes quite specifically the conditions under which an offender may be designated as 
dangerous”: R. v. Lyons, [1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, at 347 (S.C.C.)). Also see R. v. 
Luxton, [1990] S.C.J. No. 87, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 at 722-23 (S.C.C.) (upholding the sentencing 
scheme for first degree murder on a similar basis).  
23
 See R. v. Swain, [1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, at 1013 (S.C.C.) (the Criminal 
Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 provisions requiring trial judges to automatically commit those found 
not guilty by reason of insanity to strict custody, without considering their particular mental health 
circumstances, found to be unconstitutional under s. 9).  
24
 R. v. Lyons, [1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, at 348 (S.C.C.). 
25
 R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621, at 633 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. 
Ladouceur, [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257, at 1276 (S.C.C.); R. v. Morales, [1992] 
S.C.J. No. 98, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, at 740 (S.C.C.); R. v. Pearson, [1992] S.C.J. No. 99, [1992]  
3 S.C.R. 665, at 699-700 (S.C.C.) (noting that “detention is arbitrary if it is governed by unstructured 
discretion”). 
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Beyond identifying minimum constitutional requirements for legislative 
standards that authorize an interference with liberty, the Supreme Court 
recently added a procedural layer to section 9.26 In Charkaoui27 the Court 
was faced with a constitutional challenge to the security certificate scheme 
found in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.28 The Court found 
a number of Charter violations, including a breach of section 9. According 
to the Court, by precluding those subject to security certificates from 
seeking judicial review of the reasons for their detention for at least 120 
days, the legislative scheme ran a foul of section 9. The Court emphasized 
that there was no compelling reason justifying the delay. This violated 
section 9 because it amounted to a “complete denial of a timely detention 
review”.29 The judgment leaves for another day what, if any, additional 
procedural requirements might be constitutionally mandated in order for 
a legislative scheme authorizing detention or imprisonment to comply 
with section 9. 
The second category of claims under section 9 of the Charter involves 
challenges directed at the decision to detain or imprison in individual 
cases. In the Charter’s early years, the struggle to give meaning to the 
arbitrariness standard, in this context, reduced many Canadian courts to the 
use of dictionary definitions. In a series of cases, courts across the country 
held that the decision to detain or imprison will have been undertaken 
“arbitrarily” if it is made in a “capricious”, “despotic”, “high-handed”, 
“unreasonable”, or “unjustified” manner.30 In this way much of the 
                                                                                                            
26
 See Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007]  
1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.). 
27
 Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007]  
1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.). 
28 S.C. 2001, c. 27. 
29
 Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007]  
1 S.C.R. 350, at 403 (S.C.C.).  
30 
Initially, these terms were used to describe legislation which would offend s. 9. At that 
time the Supreme Court had not yet provided more meaningful guidance on the topic: see R. v. 
Mitchell, [1983] O.J. No. 3109, 6 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at 210 (Ont. H.C.J.); R. v. Konechny, [1983] 
B.C.J. No. 2244, 10 C.C.C. (3d) 233, at 254 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Smith, [1984] B.C.J. No. 1506, 11 
C.C.C. (3d) 411, at 416-17 (B.C.C.A.), revd on other grounds [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 
97 (S.C.C.); R. v. Langevin, [1984] O.J. No. 3159, 11 C.C.C. (3d) 336, at 358 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. 
Slaney, [1985] N.J. No. 60, 22 C.C.C. (3d) 240, at 248 (Nfld. C.A.). The use of these terms was 
soon extended to the context of challenges to specific decisions to detain or imprison: see Belliveau 
v. Canada, [1984] A.C.F. no 162, 13 C.C.C. (3d) 138, at 146 (F.C.T.D.); R. v. McIntosh, [1984] 
B.C.J. No. 1866, 29 M.V.R. 50, at 58 (B.C.C.A.); Maxie v. Canada (National Parole Board), 
[1985] A.C.F. no 138, 47 C.R. (3d) 22, at 33 (F.C.T.D.); R. v. Williamson, [1986] A.J. No. 52,  
25 C.C.C. (3d) 139, at 144-45 (Alta. Q.B.); R. v. Cayer, [1988] O.J. No. 1120, 66 C.R. (3d) 30,  
at 43 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Baker, [1988] N.S.J. No. 421, 9 M.V.R. (2d) 165, at 167 (N.S.C.A.); R. v. 
Sieben, [1989] A.J. No. 939, 51 C.C.C. (3d) 343, at 364 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Scott, [1990] B.C.J.  
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jurisprudence served to “shift the search for meaning from one synonym 
to another”.31 The elusive nature of the arbitrariness standard has been 
the principal source of uncertainty surrounding the purpose and meaning 
of the guarantee. 
Uncertainty regarding the meaning of “arbitrariness” in this second 
category of cases, those involving decisions by individual police officers 
to detain or arrest, poses serious problems. The case law now makes 
clear that an investigative detention that takes place in the absence of 
objectively justifiable grounds to suspect that the person being detained is 
involved in recently committed or unfolding criminal activity is unlawful.32 
Similarly, a conventional arrest in the absence of reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that an individual has committed an indictable offence 
is also illegal.33 Nevertheless, despite 25 years of litigation under section 9 
of the Charter, it remains rather unclear as to when an unlawful interference 
with individual liberty will qualify as arbitrary and run afoul of the 
Constitution. 
To date, the Supreme Court has refrained from expressly resolving 
the issue. In Latimer,34 for example, the Court acknowledged that there 
is uncertainty as to whether “unlawful” and “arbitrarily” are necessarily 
one and the same for section 9 purposes, but carefully refrained from 
deciding the issue.35 The clearest guidance from the Court has come in 
the form of obiter suggesting that an arrest will violate section 9 of the 
Charter if it is undertaken “because a police officer was biased towards 
a person of a different race, nationality or colour, or that there was a 
                                                                                                            
No. 2039, 24 M.V.R. (2d) 204, at 210 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Madsen, [1994] B.C.J. No. 709, 21 C.R.R. 
(2d) 376, at 382 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Iron, [1987] S.J. No. 49, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 157, at 177-78 (Sask. C.A.) 
(“capriciousness” adopted but “unjustified” considered and then specifically rejected). 
31
 R. v. Smith, [1984] B.C.J. No. 1506, 11 C.C.C. (3d) 411, at 423 (S.C.C.), Lambert J.A., 
dissenting (cautioning that while these “words may be illustrative of the meaning of ‘arbitrary’, . . . 
they should not be regarded as definitive”). Also see R. v. Konechny, [1983] B.C.J. No. 2244, 10 
C.C.C. (3d) 233, at 243 (B.C.C.A.), Lambert J.A., dissenting. 
32 
See R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52 (S.C.C.). Unfortunately, although 
the Court makes clear that “an investigative detention that is carried out in accordance with the 
common law power recognized in this case will not infringe the detainee’s rights under s. 9 of the 
Charter” (R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52, at 71 (S.C.C.)) it does not address 
whether or not an unlawful investigative detention will necessarily violate the guarantee. 
33 
See R. v. Storrey, [1990] S.C.J. No. 12, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241, at 250-51 (S.C.C.).  
34
 R. v. Latimer, [1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.). 
35
 See R. v. Latimer, [1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217, at 232 (S.C.C.) (Lamer C.J.C., 
on behalf of the majority, indicated “it is not necessary to address that question, because Mr. 
Latimer’s arrest was entirely lawful, and failing an attack against the legislative provision which 
authorized the arrest, I do not see how a lawful arrest can contravene s. 9 of the Charter for being 
arbitrary”). 
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personal enmity between a police officer directed towards the person 
arrested”.36 This observation has equal force with respect to all detentions, 
not just those culminating in arrest. It is difficult to imagine anything more 
unjustified and arbitrary than a detention undertaken for a discriminatory 
motive37 or some other “improper” purpose.38 
More recently, in Clayton,39 the ancillary powers doctrine was applied 
by the Court to uphold a criminal investigative roadblock stop and search. 
In the wee hours of the morning, police responded to a call that there 
were men in a parking lot brandishing handguns. Police attended the 
location within minutes and stopped a car the appellants were travelling 
in just as it exited the parking lot. Both men were searched and a loaded 
handgun was ultimately seized. Applying the ancillary powers doctrine, 
the Court concluded that the police acted lawfully and therefore no 
Charter violation resulted. At the beginning of its judgment, however, in 
introducing its analysis, the Court said the following: 
 If the police conduct in detaining and searching Clayton and Farmer 
amounted to a lawful exercise of their common law powers, there was 
no violation of their Charter rights. If, on the other hand, the conduct 
fell outside the scope of these powers, it represented an infringement 
of the right under the Charter not to be arbitrarily detained or 
subjected to an unreasonable search or seizure.40 
(underlining and emphasis added) 
Unfortunately, in framing the question as though there was only a 
single right at issue and then bunching together the constitutional 
implications of an illegal search and detention, the Court makes it less 
than clear whether it intended to suggest that an unlawful detention is 
necessarily a violation of section 9. Especially given the Court’s earlier 
acknowledgment of the issue in Latimer41 and its decision in that case to 
defer the question until it is ripe for consideration, there is a danger that 
                                                                                                            
36
 R. v. Storrey, [1990] S.C.J. No. 12, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241, at 251-52 (S.C.C.). 
37 
Of course, if a police officer is motivated by some bias that implicates one of the prohibited 
grounds of discrimination under s. 15(1) of the Charter, then that section would also be violated.  
38 
See Brown v. Durham (Regional Municipality) Police Force, [1998] O.J. No. 5274,  
131 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 17 (Ont. C.A.) (in the “improper purposes” category the Court sensibly includes 
“purposes which are illegal, purposes which involve the infringement of a person’s constitutional 
rights and purposes which have nothing to do with the execution of a police officer’s public duty”).  
39 
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.).  
40 
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at 459 (S.C.C.). 
41 
R. v. Latimer, [1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.). 
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the quoted passage from Clayton42 will have little effect. Faced with this 
sort of uncertain obiter, trial judges may rather understandably continue 
to take their lead from the opinions of Canadian appellate courts. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Duguay43 remains the 
leading case on the relationship between unlawful and arbitrary detentions. 
It came soon after the Charter’s enactment. Like many early decisions 
interpreting “arbitrarily”, it imports into the constitutional equation the need 
for an oblique motive on the part of the arresting officer. According to 
Duguay, someone who is unlawfully arrested is not necessarily “arbitrarily 
detained”. This is because the basis for an arrest may fall “just short” 
of the reasonable and probable grounds needed to arrest. Given this, as 
MacKinnon A.C.J.O. explains,  
The person making the arrest may honestly, though mistakenly, believe 
that reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest exist and there may 
be some basis for that belief. In those circumstances the arrest, though 
subsequently found to be unlawful, could not be said to be capricious 
or arbitrary. On the other hand, the entire absence of reasonable and 
probable grounds for the arrest could support an inference that no 
reasonable person could have genuinely believed that such grounds 
existed. In such cases, the conclusion would be that the person arrested 
was arbitrarily detained. Between these two ends of the spectrum, shading 
from white to grey to black, the issue whether an accused was arbitrarily 
detained will depend, basically, on two considerations: first, the particular 
facts of the case, and secondly, the view taken by the court with 
respect to the extent of the departure from the standard of reasonable 
and probable grounds and the honesty of the belief and basis for the 
belief in the existence of reasonable and probable grounds on the part 
of the person making the arrest.44 
(emphasis added) 
Subsequently, in Simpson,45 the case that first applied the ancillary 
powers doctrine to recognize an investigative detention power, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal suggested that this very same sort of analysis is necessary 
                                                                                                            
42 
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.). 
43 
[1985] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289, at 296 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1989] S.C.J. No. 4, 
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 93 (S.C.C.) (without addressing this issue) (Duguay). 
44
 R. v. Duguay, [1985] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289, at 296 (Ont. C.A.). In Duguay, 
the Court held that s. 9 of the Charter was violated because the police “had neither grounds nor an 
honest belief that they had the necessary grounds” to arrest the three accused. R. v. Duguay, [1985] 
O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289, at 297 (Ont. C.A.).  
45
 R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont. C.A.).  
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where a detention for investigative purposes is found to have taken place 
unlawfully because of a deficiency in a police officer’s grounds to detain.46 
Because of Duguay,47 a police officer’s good faith reliance on his or 
her suspicions may cure the wrong of an unlawful detention or arrest. The 
analysis in each case will turn on how far off the mark the officer’s grounds 
happened to be when viewed objectively. If the officer’s grounds were 
woefully deficient, then section 9 is violated. But if the officer’s grounds 
fall “just short” of the legally required grounds, then the wrong of an 
unlawful detention or arrest may not be a matter of constitutional concern. 
Over the past 20 years courts across the country have endorsed the 
unlawful versus arbitrary distinction recognized in Duguay.48 A number 
of courts have emphasized the distinction in upholding unlawful detentions 
as nevertheless constitutional under section 9 of the Charter.49 Some 
courts have taken the cleansing potential of the unlawful versus arbitrary 
dichotomy to rather unfortunate extremes. 
For example, the Manitoba Court of Appeal has reasoned, in cases 
involving actual “arrests” (i.e., the use of words of arrest, physical restraint, 
handcuffs and a probing search for evidence and weapons) that section 9 
was not violated because the police in fact had the requisite grounds to 
carry out an investigative detention.50 Of course, what this sort of analysis 
                                                                                                            
46
 R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482, at 504 (Ont. C.A.) where 
Doherty J.A., after introducing the investigative detention power to Canadian law, noted that:  
“Following Duguay, supra, it may be that a detention although unlawful would not be arbitrary if 
the officer erroneously believed on reasonable grounds that he had an articulable cause. I need not 
decide whether such a belief could avoid an infringement of s. 9 of the Charter.” 
47
 R. v. Duguay, [1985] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1989] S.C.J. 
No. 4, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 93 (S.C.C.). 
48
 R. v. Duguay, [1989] S.C.J. No. 4, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 93 (S.C.C.). For example, see R. v. 
Brown, [1987] N.S.J. No. 22, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 54, at 67-68 (N.S.C.A.); Freeman v. West Vancouver 
(District), [1992] B.C.J. No. 2146, 19 B.C.A.C. 81, at para. 29 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Campbell, [2003] 
M.J. No. 207, 175 C.C.C. (3d) 452, at paras. 39-42 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Perello [2005] S.J. No. 60, 
193 C.C.C. (3d) 151, at para. 40 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Payne, [2006] N.J. No. 259, 41 C.R. (6th) 234, 
at para. 26 (Nfld. T.D.). 
49
 For some examples, see R. v. Pimental, [2000] M.J. No. 256, 145 Man. R. (2d) 295 
(Man. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 359 (S.C.C.); R. v. Capistrano, [2000] 
M.J. No. 340, 149 Man. R. (2d) 42 (Man. Q.B.); R. v. Speller, [1993] O.J. No. 2324, 47 M.V.R. (2d) 129 
(Ont. Prov. Div.); R. v. Brown, [1987] N.S.J. No. 22, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 54, at 67-68 (N.S.C.A.). But 
see R. v. Simpson, [1994] N.J. No. 69, 88 C.C.C. (3d) 377, at 388 (Nfld. C.A.), revd in the result 
only [1995] S.C.J. No. 12, 95 C.C.C. (3d) 96 (S.C.C.) (implicitly questioning this approach but 
without referring to R. v. Duguay, [1989] S.C.J. No. 4, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 93 (S.C.C.)). Also see R. v. 
Porquez, [1991] A.J. No. 103, 114 A.R. 1 (Alta. C.A.), leave refused (1991), 137 N.R. 160n 
(S.C.C.) (holding that an arrest in the absence of reasonable and probable grounds violated s. 9 of 
the Charter without ever addressing the subjective mind set of the arresting officers).  
50
 See R. v. Campbell, [2003] M.J. No. 207, 175 C.C.C. (3d) 452, at paras. 39-43 (Man. C.A.); 
R. v. Willis, [2003] M.J. No. 117, 174 C.C.C. (3d) 406, at paras. 18-31 (Man. C.A.).  
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ignores is that in such cases the police did not merely detain, they arrested. 
To uphold such arrests as constitutional effectively transforms the lower 
standard that justifies investigative detentions into the de facto standard 
for conventional arrests. In other words, the distinction can all too easily 
be used to uphold as constitutional, significant and illegal intrusions on 
individual liberty. 
It would seem that uncertainty about the purpose of section 9 has 
led directly to the birth of unlawful versus arbitrary dichotomy. With the 
passage of time, the distinction has grown more entrenched and its negative 
effects have only seemed to spread. This has resulted in a section 9 
jurisprudence that can fairly be described as impoverished. 
In the remainder of this Part, it will be argued that what Duguay51 
has to say about the meaning of “arbitrarily” in section 9 of the Charter 
is wrong and long overdue for express overruling. By exploring why an 
unlawful detention should necessarily equate with an “arbitrary” detention 
under section 9, the larger purpose of this important constitutional 
guarantee will hopefully become apparent. 
In giving “arbitrarily” meaning, the Duguay52 Court did not have the 
benefit of later Supreme Court decisions that explained the need for a 
“purposive” approach in the interpretation of the Charter’s guarantees.53 
Under this method, dictionary definitions are to be avoided.54 Instead, 
the words used are to be read in a manner that best achieves the purpose 
underlying the guarantee. In identifying that purpose, the court may look 
to the larger objects of the Charter, the actual language used to express the 
right, the historical origins of the guarantee (including its drafting history) 
and its interrelationship to the other constitutional provisions. Ultimately, 
the interpretation “should be a generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed 
at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for individuals the 
full benefit of the Charter’s protection”.55 These factors each point 
                                                                                                            
51
 R. v. Duguay, [1985] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.). 
52
 R. v. Duguay, [1985] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.). 
53
 See Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 156 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 344 (S.C.C.); Reference re 
Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 499 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 641 (S.C.C.), Le Dain J., dissenting in the result only. 
54
 Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155 (S.C.C.) 
(instructing that the meaning of the Charter’s guarantees should not “be determined by recourse to a 
dictionary, nor for that matter, by reference to the rules of statutory construction. The task of 
expounding a constitution is crucially different from that of construing a statute”). 
55
 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 344 (S.C.C.). 
Also see S.R. Peck, “An Analytical Framework for the Application of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms” (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, at 6-30; P.W. Hogg, “The Charter of Rights 
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toward an interpretation that treats any unlawful detention as necessarily 
arbitrary and therefore a violation of section 9 of the Charter. 
Any effort to reconcile the Duguay56 decision with the purposive 
approach runs into immediate difficulty. Like most early judgments 
interpreting section 9, the case is based on dictionary definitions that 
transform a malevolent motivation into the touchstone for arbitrariness. 
Such a reading is inconsistent with the larger objects of the Charter and 
its legal rights guarantees.57 By subordinating legality and individual 
liberty interests to the subjective mindset of an arresting officer, this 
interpretation cuts against the very purpose of the Charter. If protecting 
the individual vis-à-vis the state is the primary objective, it makes little 
sense to view the encounter from the perspective of the responsible state 
official rather than from the perspective of the individual whose liberty 
has been unlawfully suspended. For the person aggrieved it is cold 
comfort that a state official’s grounds to detain or arrest fall “just short” 
of what the law requires. A “generous” interpretation would recognize 
that an unlawful detention or arrest is necessarily arbitrary and contrary 
to section 9 of the Charter.58 
This interpretation is made more compelling by its connection to the 
historic approach for protecting liberty in Canada. The Anglo-Canadian 
common law constitution has long required that any interference with 
individual liberty be based on lawful authority. This proposition, known 
as the “principle of legality”59 requires that “every official act must be 
                                                                                                            
and American Theories of Interpretation” (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 87, at 97-103 (explaining 
the “purposive” approach). 
56
 R. v. Duguay, [1985] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.). 
57
 See Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155 (S.C.C.)  
(the purpose of the Charter is “the unremitting protection of individual rights and liberties”); R. v. 
Debot, [1989] S.C.J. No. 118, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, at 1173 (S.C.C.) (“The legal rights guaranteed 
by the Charter are designed inter alia to circumscribe these coercive powers of the state within 
boundaries of justice and fairness to the individual.”); R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990]  
2 S.C.R. 151, at 179 (S.C.C.) (“[I]t is to the control of the superior power of the state vis-à-vis the 
individual who has been detained by the state, and thus placed in its power, that s. 7 and the related 
provisions that follow are primarily directed.”). For a discussion regarding the purpose of the legal 
rights guarantees, see James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police 
Powers and the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1, at 6-12. 
58
 See P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed., looseleaf (Scarborough, ON: 
Carswell, 1997-) at 46-5 (after acknowledging the effect of R. v. Duguay, [1985] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. 
(3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1989] S.C.J. No. 4, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 93 (S.C.C.), the author writes that 
“[p]robably, . . . strict compliance with the law is a necessary (although not a sufficient) condition 
for compliance with s. 9”). 
59
 See Leonard Herschel Leigh, Police Powers in England and Wales, 2d ed. (London: 
Butterworths, 1985), at 32-33. Professor Hogg refers to this idea as the “principle of validity”. See 
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justified by law”.60 This idea has an extraordinarily long history: it can 
be traced back to Blackstone,61 Entick v. Carrington,62 and even the 
Magna Carta.63 
Not surprisingly then, Dicey characterized this concept as central to 
the “rule of law”. For him the antithesis of this “fundamental principle 
of the constitution” was the exercise of “arbitrary power”64 Of specific 
interest, given our interpretive task, is one of the ways in which Dicey 
illustrated this point in his seminal text on English constitutional law, 
noting that the English constitution forbids “arbitrary arrest”.65 This 
evidences a long history of equating illegality with arbitrariness. But 
looking this far back is not essential. The drafting history also provides 
a compelling and more contemporary justification for choosing this 
interpretation. 
At least on a superficial level, section 9 of the Charter seems capable 
of being traced to section 2(a) of the Canadian Bill of Rights66 of 1960. 
That section provided that “no law of Canada shall be construed or applied 
so as to authorize or effect the arbitrary detention, imprisonment or exile 
of any person[.]” Unfortunately that section, like much of the federally 
legislated Bill of Rights, had no practical impact, never proving decisive 
before any appellate court.67 Nevertheless, the fact that “arbitrariness” 
                                                                                                            
P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed., looseleaf (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 1997-), 
at 31-4.  
60
 P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed., looseleaf (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 
1997-). 
61
 See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (Chicago: 
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figures prominently in both provisions is no accident. Both seem to have 
been influenced by article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,68 which provides that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest, detention or exile.”69 There was, however, another international 
influence helping to shape the drafting of section 9. In 1966, after the 
Bill of Rights70 but long before the Charter, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights71 came into effect. It included an article that 
was undoubtedly instrumental in shaping the language that ultimately made 
its way into what would become section 9 of the Charter.72
 
Its influence is 
best considered in the context of other developments that shaped the 
ultimate wording of section 9, and also served to influence the wording 
of what would become section 8. As a result, it is sensible to consider 
earlier versions of both guarantees in tandem. 
During the constitutional negotiations between the provincial and 
federal governments in 1980, the criminal process was not at the top of 
anyone’s agenda. The October 1980 draft of the Charter, placed before 
the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, 
included a section designed to foreclose the exclusion of evidence as a 
remedy for constitutional violations.73 Like earlier drafts, it contained a 
series of legal rights guarantees.74 In response to strong objections from 
the provinces to the wording in the August 1980 draft,75 the federal 
government significantly reworded what would become sections 8 and 9: 
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GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966). 
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 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), 21 UN 
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), art. 9(1). 
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 See October 1980 Draft of the Charter, s. 26, reproduced in Anne F. Bayefsky, Canada’s 
Constitution Act 1982 & Amendments: A Documentary History , vol. 2 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill 
Ryerson, 1989), at 751.  
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 October 1980 Draft of the Charter, ss. 7-14, reproduced in Anne F. Bayefsky, Canada’s 
Constitution Act 1982 & Amendments: A Documentary History, vol. 2 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill 
Ryerson, 1989).  
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 See Provincial Proposal, August 29, 1980, reproduced in Anne F. Bayefsky, Canada’s 
Constitution Act 1982 & Amendments: A Documentary History, vol. 2 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill 
Ryerson, 1989), at 683-85. The provinces unanimously sought the deletion of s. 7, and — with the 
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August 1980 Draft76 October 1980 Draft77 
7. Everyone has the right to be secure 
against unreasonable search and seizure. 
8. Everyone has the right not to be subjected 
to search or seizure except on grounds, and 
in accordance with procedures, established 
by law. 
8. Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily 
detained or imprisoned.  
9. Everyone has the right not to be detained 
or imprisoned except on grounds, and in 
accordance with procedures, established 
by law. 
For the provinces, the goal of these changes was to “clarify and limit 
the scope of legal rights”.78 This led to modifications in the language of 
both sections 8 and 9 that would have done little more than codify the 
principle of legality (“except on grounds, and in accordance with 
procedures, established by law”). 
A number of organizations that made representations before the Special 
Joint Committee were critical of the October 1980 draft. They feared 
that without a remedies provision, the Charter would prove ineffective. 
As a result, they urged the Special Joint Committee to add a provision 
that would at least allow for the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence. These same groups also expressed grave doubts about the 
wording found in the October 1980 draft of sections 8 and 9.79 For 
example, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association observed that the two 
provisions were little more than “a verbal illusion”; they “pretend to give 
us something” while granting “us nothing more than we already have”.80 
They pointed out, correctly, that these sections still left open the potential 
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 See August 1980 Draft of the Charter, reproduced in Anne F. Bayefsky, Canada’s 
Constitution Act 1982 & Amendments: A Documentary History , vol. 2 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill 
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 Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the 
Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, vol. 1, No. 7, at 12 (November 
18, 1980) (Mr. Alan Borovoy, General Counsel, Canadian Civil Liberties Association). 
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for legislation authorizing searches and seizures or detentions and 
imprisonments on the most arbitrary of bases. The federal government 
took these concerns seriously, responding with amendments that — with 
some refinement by the Special Joint Committee — ultimately became 
sections 8, 9 and 24 of the Charter.81 In putting forward these “major 
changes”, Jean Chrétien (then federal Minister of Justice and Attorney 
General) explained that the changes to sections 8 and 9 meant that: 
. . . the fact that procedures are established by law will not be conclusive 
proof that search and seizure or detention is legal. Such procedures and 
the laws on which they are based will have to meet the tests of being 
reasonable and not being arbitrary.82 
The goal of the changes following the October 1980 draft were clear 
— to strengthen, not weaken — the protection afforded by sections 8 
and 9.83 Later, when questions were raised as to whether legality should 
be specifically mentioned in section 9, a Deputy Minister of Justice assured 
the Committee that such a change was unnecessary because if a detention 
“were illegal, . . . against the law, then it would be annulled by the 
courts for that very reason”.84 To the limited extent that the “framers’ 
intent” may be gleaned from such historical materials,85 it would appear 
to have been assumed that illegal detentions would be subsumed by the 
arbitrariness standard contained in section 9 of the Charter. 
On such a reading section 9 would operate very much like article 
9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In part, 
that provision indicates that: “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest or detention [and that] [n]o one shall be deprived of his liberty 
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except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are 
established by law.”86 This wording looks like an amalgam of section 9 
and its earlier drafts. As Canada is a signatory to the Covenant, having 
agreed to implement its provisions into its domestic law, a reading of 
section 9 that equates arbitrariness with illegality would better serve to 
fulfil Canada’s international treaty obligations. Although not a conclusive 
interpretive consideration, this is an additional reason for reading 
“arbitrarily” to include “unlawful”.87 
Finally, if the Supreme Court chooses to expressly endorse this 
approach, it would bring consistency to the interpretation of the legal 
rights guarantees. Legality, for instance, is a precondition for a search or 
seizure to be “reasonable” under section 8 of the Charter.88 Even a 
commendable motive on the part of the police or grounds that fall “just 
short” of the legal standard cannot cure the wrong of an unlawful intrusion 
upon reasonable privacy expectations. That said, it is worth noting that 
this was not always the case. Much as with section 9 and unlawful 
detentions, early appellate court judgments had concluded that not every 
unlawful search or seizure would necessarily be “unreasonable” and violate 
section 8.89 Thankfully, however, the Supreme Court did away with this 
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impossible distinction.90 In the relatively early years of the Charter, the 
Court held that the first essential precondition for any search or seizure 
to be considered “reasonable” under section 8 is that it be “authorized by 
law”.91 In other words, given the long-standing importance of the principle 
of legality, the Supreme Court rather sensibly read it as the starting point 
for any “reasonable” search or seizure. 
Strangely, the Supreme Court has carefully avoided doing the same 
for section 9. The closest the Court has come is a recent and rather 
overdue acknowledgment that the guarantee “expresses one of the most 
fundamental norms of the rule of law. The state may not detain arbitrarily, 
but only in accordance with law”.92 Unfortunately, this statement came 
in a case involving a challenge to a legislative scheme, not in the context 
of a challenge to the decision to detain in an individual case. Be that as 
it may, this observation seems entirely in keeping with an interpretation 
of section 9 that would equate any unlawful interference with individual 
liberty as an arbitrary and unconstitutional one. 
None of this is to suggest that the good intentions of law enforcement 
are irrelevant to constitutional outcomes. To the contrary, as the Supreme 
Court’s seminal decision under section 24(2) of the Charter makes clear, 
in deciding whether or not to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence, 
among other factors, a court must consider if a violation occurred  
“in good faith, or was inadvertent or of a merely technical nature, or 
whether it was deliberate, wilful or flagrant”.93 This provides further 
support for reconsidering what “arbitrarily” means. It makes little sense 
to count a police officer’s good intentions twice in the constitutional 
analysis, especially when an interest as fundamental as individual liberty 
is at stake. 
As this review hopefully makes plain, the ultimate purpose of the 
guarantee would appear to be the protection of individual liberty interests 
from unjustified state interference. It was this idea that the drafters were 
attempting to capture in the language chosen to articulate the guarantee. 
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The October 1980 draft only went part way by employing phrasing that 
would entrench the principle of legality. The drafters quickly realized 
that this was inadequate given their aspiration for a constitutional guarantee 
that would safeguard individual liberty against unjustified state interference. 
This far more ambitious goal also required the use of wording that would 
entitle courts to measure the adequacy of the standards and protections 
included in any legislated scheme that authorizes a deprivation of liberty. 
Unfortunately, experience has shown that without timely guidance from 
the Supreme Court, the word chosen — arbitrarily — has leant itself to a 
narrow interpretation that is not in keeping with the true purpose of 
section 9. A purposive reading reveals the true object of this constitutional 
right and lays bare the means by which its fundamentally important purpose 
can be realized. 
First, section 9 serves to entrench the long-standing Anglo-Canadian 
constitutional principle that government cannot interfere with individual 
liberty absent lawful authority to the contrary. In order for this important 
constitutional principle to have practical meaning, any unlawful interference 
with individual liberty must necessarily be treated as “arbitrary” and a 
violation of section 9 of the Charter. 
Second, the guarantee supplements that historic safeguard by 
empowering courts to scrutinize laws authorizing detention or imprisonment 
and to invalidate those that would operate “arbitrarily”. The Supreme 
Court has already put the second aspect of the guarantee into action — 
developing section 9 standards for assessing the constitutional adequacy 
of criteria and procedures governing state authority to interfere with 
individual liberty. 
In recent years there have been mixed signals from the courts on 
whether or not unlawful detentions will be viewed as inherently arbitrary 
and a violation of section 9.94 In maintaining this distinction, the courts 
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are no doubt concerned about all of the potential ramifications of equating 
illegality with arbitrariness. A conclusion that each is synonymous would 
have far-reaching implications beyond unjustified detentions and arrests. 
For instance, if it were established that a police officer arrested in 
circumstances where he or she was obligated not to under the Criminal 
Code,95 or failed to release someone following an arrest as the Code 
required,96 the resulting unlawful detention would be characterized as 
arbitrary and unconstitutional.97 Similarly, a failure on the part of police 
to bring an accused before a justice within 24 hours of an arrest98 would 
necessarily be unconstitutional — regardless of any good explanation 
for the delay.99 No doubt, these ripple effects are a strong incentive for 
courts to maintain their commitment to the Duguay approach. They fear 
being required to characterize as “arbitrary” — and unconstitutional — 
unlawful detentions resulting from “a technical error of process”.100 
To date, a major mistake under section 9 of the Charter has been the 
muddying of conceptual waters through the creation of an unnecessary 
dichotomy between unlawful and arbitrary detentions. Although, as noted 
above, a similar trend emerged under the early section 8 Charter 
jurisprudence, as to whether “unlawful” searches or seizures were 
necessarily “unreasonable”, the Supreme Court quickly put an end to this 
debate by making lawful authority a precondition for reasonableness.101 
The result has been much clearer constitutional standards and more 
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well-defined statutory search and seizure powers.102 The technical or 
inadvertent nature of a constitutional violation is best dealt with when 
fashioning the appropriate remedy. This is the great benefit of a 
discretionary exclusionary rule. It permits the courts to interpret the 
constitution’s guarantees purposively, free from concerns that an overly 
generous approach might have an unfair exclusionary effect in some 
unforeseeable future case.103 
Recognizing that unlawful detentions or arrests — those undertaken 
without the legally required grounds — are necessarily unconstitutional 
under section 9 of the Charter does not bring an end to our task. You will 
remember that our goal was to also revisit the meaning of “detention” 
from a perspective that openly takes into account the purpose of section 
9, which we have now identified as being the protection of individual 
liberty from unjustified state interference. 
III. THE EFFECT OF READING “DETENTION” PURPOSIVELY 
To engage section 9’s protection, the interaction between an 
individual and a state actor must first qualify either as a “detention” or 
as an “imprisonment”. Unlike “detention”, the objective indicators of 
“imprisonment” are much more obvious and not at all controversial. The 
presence of prison bars, locked doors, prison uniforms and jail guards 
clearly signify a deprivation of liberty that is sufficiently prolonged to 
warrant the more severe label of “imprisonment”. Unfortunately, “detention” 
provides a far less certain and therefore much more controversial standard 
for engaging the protection of the constitutional guarantee. 
Beyond section 9, “detention” also appears as one of the threshold 
requirements for triggering the protections found in section 10, which is 
engaged “on arrest or detention”. It was a case involving section 10(b), 
the right to counsel, which first raised the meaning of this important 
term before the Supreme Court. 
In R. v. Therens,104 a motorist involved in a single-vehicle car accident 
accompanied a police officer back to the police division, in response to 
a breath demand, for the purpose of taking a breathalyzer test. The 
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motorist was not told about his right to counsel. One of the issues before 
the Supreme Court was whether the motorist was “detained” during the 
period following the breath demand but preceding his arrest. 
Although the Court divided on the ultimate result, Le Dain J.’s 
opinion represented the views of the majority on the issue of detention. 
In concluding that there was indeed a “detention” in this case, Le Dain J. 
persuasively reasoned that the very narrow construction given to that 
term under the Canadian Bill of Rights105 should not be controlling of its 
meaning under the Charter.106 In coming to this conclusion on behalf of 
the Court, Le Dain J. pointed out “that the Charter must be regarded, 
because of its constitutional character, as a new affirmation of rights and 
freedoms and of judicial power and responsibility in relation to their 
protection”.107 Beyond the general purpose of the Charter, Le Dain J.’s 
interpretation of “detention” was also informed by the more specific 
purpose of section 10.108 Bearing in mind these considerations, Le Dain J. 
identified the existence of “compulsory restraint” as being the key to the 
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meaning of “detention”.109 He acknowledged that such restraint might 
take varying forms. 
Compulsory restraint may involve physical interference with the 
individual’s freedom of movement.110 So, for example, if a police officer 
grasps an individual’s arm, uses handcuffs or confines someone in the back 
seat of a police cruiser, a “detention” would obviously seem to result. 
Compulsion can also be of a psychological or mental nature, noted 
Le Dain J. So, for example, where an individual acquiesces in response 
to a demand or direction by a police officer and reasonably believes that 
the choice to do otherwise does not exist, that person is “detained”. On 
this view of things, where non-compliance with a demand or direction 
would constitute an offence, as it would have in Therens,111 given the 
statutory duty to furnish a breath sample, Le Dain J. reasoned that 
acquiescence cannot be considered voluntary and should be viewed as 
sufficiently compelled to result in a “detention”.112 
In a passage that is arguably obiter,113 Le Dain J. went on to make a 
rather important observation about the reality of most interactions between 
members of the public and the police. He indicated: 
 Although it is not strictly necessary for purposes of this case,  
I would go further. In my opinion, it is not realistic, as a general rule, 
to regard compliance with a demand or direction by a police officer as 
truly voluntary, in the sense that the citizen feels that he or she has the 
choice to obey or not, even where there is in fact a lack of statutory or 
common law authority for the demand or direction and therefore an 
absence of criminal liability for failure to comply with it. Most citizens 
are not aware of the precise legal limits of police authority. Rather 
than risk the application of physical force or prosecution for wilful 
obstruction, the reasonable person is likely to err on the side of caution, 
assume lawful authority and comply with the demand. The element  
of psychological compulsion, in the form of a reasonable perception  
of suspension of freedom of choice, is enough to make the restraint of 
liberty involuntary. Detention may be effected without the application 
or threat of application of physical restraint if the person concerned 
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submits or acquiesces in the deprivation of liberty and reasonably believes 
that the choice to do otherwise does not exist.114 
On a number of subsequent occasions the Supreme Court has 
unconditionally endorsed what Therens115 had to say about the meaning 
of “detention” both of the physical and psychological kind.116 This has 
periodically included express approval of Le Dain J.’s obiter comments 
about the reality of how a police demand or direction will tend to 
compel compliance on the part of most reasonable members of the 
community.117 
Not long after Therens118 was decided, its definition of “detention” 
was transplanted from section 10 to section 9. The Supreme Court 
concluded that there is “no reason in principle why the general approach 
to the meaning of detention reflected in those cases should not be applied to 
the meaning of ‘detained’ in s. 9”.119 This threshold requirement for 
engaging section 9 therefore took shape without any express reference 
to the purpose underlying this important Charter guarantee. 
Because of statutory obligations, when motorists comply with a 
direction to stop their vehicles120 or agree to provide a breath sample in 
response to a breath demand,121 they are clearly “detained” for section 9 
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purposes. In almost all other circumstances, however, whether an encounter 
between a police officer and an individual constitutes a “detention” 
ultimately depends on the particular facts of a given case. 
In most cases that come before the courts, the facts are invariably 
viewed through the distorting influence of hindsight, where the court is 
being asked to grant Charter relief for the benefit of a factually guilty 
accused. In other words, these are the cases in which police suspicions 
and perseverance have paid off, yielding evidence of criminality in the 
form of either a confession or contraband, and sometimes both. To date, 
these cases have been adjudicated without any express acknowledgment 
of the purpose of section 9. That purpose, it will be remembered, is to 
protect everyone, innocent or guilty, from unjustified state interferences 
with individual liberty. Unfortunately, in actual cases that important 
objective can sometimes become obscured from view by the factual guilt 
of the claimant who seeks redress for an alleged constitutional wrong 
through the exclusion of incriminating evidence. From this vantage point, 
the cases of innocent individuals who are subjected to unjustified state 
interference with their liberty, either in the form of an unlawful detention 
or arrest, are out of sight. These are the individuals who are ultimately 
released by police because their detention or arrest failed to yield evidence 
of wrongdoing.122 
The fact that an individual proves to be innocent does not, however, 
necessarily mean that his or her detention was unjustified. Police officers 
are legally entitled to detain and even arrest based on probabilities,  
not certainties. The very purpose of allowing the police to detain for 
investigative purposes where they possess reasonable suspicion that 
someone is involved in recently committed or unfolding criminal activity 
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is to allow that officer to get to the bottom of things and ascertain whether 
or not an arrest is warranted.123 As a result, a great many innocents may 
very well get swept up in the net of reasonable suspicion. These are not the 
cases that I mean to capture when I use the term “unjustified detention”. 
Instead, our concern is deservedly on those cases of innocent 
individuals who are subject to detention or arrest in the absence of 
objectively justifiable grounds. Some of these detentions may result from 
errors made in good faith on the part of the police, for example, where a 
police officer honestly but mistakenly concludes that she has sufficient 
grounds to either detain for investigative purposes or arrest.124 There  
is also the very real risk that some such detentions may be motivated 
either consciously or, much more likely, subconsciously, by nefarious 
considerations, for example by an individual’s age, economic circumstances, 
ethnicity or race. For example, in recent years a growing body of evidence 
has emerged which strongly suggests that both Aboriginals125 and African 
Canadians126 are stopped by police at disproportionately higher rates 
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than members of other racial groups.127 Responding to this evidence, two 
provincial appellate courts recently acknowledged the reality of racial 
profiling in Canada.128 
Beyond the racial profiling context, it remains difficult to gauge how 
real the problem of unjustified police detentions might be on a more 
general level. The law reports are simply incapable of providing a fair 
representation of all cases involving police and citizen encounters. This 
judicial blind spot can fairly be characterized as a form of selection bias.129 
In other words, a representative sampling of all cases involving what 
may arguably constitute “detentions” is not what the courts see. Although 
the potential size of the problem is unknown, what is clear is the potential 
toll that unjustified detentions can have on those who experience them.130 
This detour to consider the potential distorting influence of selection 
bias was deliberate. When one considers how far Canadian courts have 
veered from Le Dain J.’s commonsensical observation about the realities of 
most individual and police encounters, it is the court’s narrow vantage 
point, coupled with an absence of any clear sense of the overarching 
purpose of section 9, that seems to best explain the rather artificial way 
in which many courts have approached their analysis of whether or not an 
individual was “detained” for Charter purposes. A few examples involving 
the judgments of Canadian appellate courts will serve to illustrate this point. 
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Arguably, R. v. Lawrence131 represents one of the worst examples of 
this strained analytical approach. In Lawrence, a police officer was 
responding to a complaint from a caller who reported that a neighbour’s 
home had just been broken into. As the officer approached the scene, he 
saw Ms. Lawrence riding her bicycle on the sidewalk some 10 houses 
away from the reported break-in. The neighbour had described the suspect 
as male, and gave a detailed description of his clothing. Ms. Lawrence 
was obviously not male, nor did her clothing match that of the suspect. 
Nevertheless, the officer decided to intercept her. The officer did this by 
pulling his police vehicle directly in front of the bicycle that Ms. Lawrence 
happened to be riding at the time. This rather understandably caused 
Ms. Lawrence to stop. The officer then exited his vehicle and, we are told, 
“asked if he could speak to her”. The questioning was directed to where 
Ms. Lawrence lived. The officer reported that he did not believe her 
answers and eventually asked to look inside her knapsack. She complied 
with the request and inside he found house-breaking instruments and 
jewellery from the house that had been broken into. The judgment reports 
that the questioning and search lasted some 25 minutes before Ms. 
Lawrence was directed to sit in the police cruiser. She was arrested five 
minutes after that. 
Remarkably, the Court concluded that Ms. Lawrence was only detained 
at the point when she was directed to sit in the police cruiser. Most 
troubling is the Court’s considerable effort to de-contextualize what so 
obviously seems to have been an entirely compelled encounter. The rather 
tortured explanation of why the police cruiser blocking Ms. Lawrence’s 
bicycle did not result in a “detention” best illustrates this shortcoming in 
the Court’s analysis: 
Such action certainly starts to take on the aspects of a physical detention 
and brings this case closer to the line separating legitimate police 
investigation from detention. However, detention involves either physical 
or psychological restraint from leaving. Here there could have been 
some physical inconvenience in driving the bicycle around the police 
cruiser, but that would have been slight and certainly did not constitute 
an impossibility. 
 Considering the interference with the appellant’s bicycle passage 
by the cruiser, one might have concluded that there was a psychological 
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detention. There was, however, no evidence that the appellant felt 
compelled to remain at the police officer’s cruiser.132 
(emphasis added) 
On this approach, facts that objectively scream out for a finding of 
“detention” are dismissed. An applicant’s failure to take the stand and 
testify to the obvious — that she did not feel free to leave — becomes 
controlling. 
The decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Grafe133 provides 
another unfortunate example of the same sort of reasoning. One early 
evening in downtown Kitchener, Mr. Grafe was observed by the police 
to be walking down the sidewalk with a second man. The attention of 
the officers was drawn to the two men because they apparently kept 
looking at the police cruiser, a fact that left one of the officers with the 
impression that there was “something not quite kosher”. As a result, the 
officers turned their police cruiser around and drove to an area on the 
road adjacent to Mr. Grafe and his companion. There was conflicting 
evidence as to what happened next. 
On the police account, the officers exited their vehicle and approached 
the two men, at which point Grafe and his companion were asked to 
identify themselves. Both men complied and were permitted to go on 
their way. In contrast, Mr. Grafe testified that neither officer ever exited 
the police cruiser. Rather, he claimed that he had been walking on the 
sidewalk when the officers stopped their vehicle, rolled down the window 
and summoned them over by saying: “Yous guys, would you please come 
over here.” Mr. Grafe was the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant, 
so he gave the police a false name. The police subsequently discovered 
his true identity and he was eventually charged with impersonation. 
On these facts, the trial judge found that Mr. Grafe felt sufficiently 
compelled by the police request that he was “detained” by the time he 
was asked to identify himself. The failure to apprise him of his right to 
counsel was found to have violated section 10(b), resulting in the exclusion 
of the evidence and his acquittal. In allowing the Crown appeal, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal viewed the circumstances rather differently. 
… the evidence does not support a finding that the respondent reasonably 
believed that he was detained. His conversation with the police occurred 
on the sidewalk of a downtown city street in daylight. The respondent 
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was not required to sit in the back seat of the cruiser. On the respondent’s 
own evidence the police officers treated him politely and used language 
of courtesy. The discussion was of short duration and the respondent 
left when it ended. The police officers could do nothing if the respondent 
had refused to talk to them because, again in Constable Kalan’s words, 
“I had nothing to . . . Nothing I could hold them with or detain them on.” 
In the light of the reasoning and result in R. v. Moran, supra, where 
the inconvenience to the accused was considerably greater than that 
experienced by the respondent, it is impossible to characterize the 
respondent’s condition during the conversation as one of detention. 
 The Charter does not seek to insulate all members of society from 
all contact with constituted authority, no matter how trivial the contact 
may be. When one considers the full range of contacts in modern society 
between state and citizen that which took place between the respondent 
and Constables Kalan and Waite on the first occasion cannot be 
characterized otherwise than as innocuous. Its occurrence was not an 
invasion of any of the respondent’s Charter rights. Accordingly, the 
evidence should not have been excluded.134 
What this analysis seems to ignore is the rather obvious point that if 
Mr. Grafe did not feel compelled to come to the police cruiser and answer 
the questions posed, then why would he have proceeded to provide the 
police with a false name? Most reasonable people, placed in the very 
position of Mr. Grafe, would feel obligated to attend at the window of 
the police cruiser and identify themselves if instructed to do so by a 
uniformed police officer in a marked cruiser. This is so, regardless of 
how politely a police officer later claims she was when making the 
“request”. For most members of the public, such a “request” will be 
quite reasonably perceived as a “direction” of the kind that no one, other 
than a seasoned defence lawyer, might reasonably think they have the 
option to refuse. 
A more recent example is provided by the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 
judgment in R. v. B. (L.).135 In B. (L.), the police were driving past a high 
school when they observed L.B., along with a second youth, apparently 
engaging in a conversation with one another, even though both young 
men were physically separated by a considerable distance, with one 
located at the top of a hill and the other near the bottom. This struck the 
officers as suspicious, so they turned their police cruiser around and 
returned to the location in order to investigate. L.B. did not testify on the 
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Charter application. The police officers did. They gave evidence that 
soon after they exited their vehicle, L.B. descended from the top of the 
hill and intercepted them. The police officers claimed that they proceeded 
to strike up a casual conversation with the two young men, that culminated 
in both being asked for their names and dates of birth. Each complied, 
and their particulars were then passed along by radio to be cross-checked 
with the Canadian Police Information Computer (CPIC) database. While 
waiting for the results, one of the officers located a knapsack that L.B. 
had been carrying when police first observed him. Neither young man 
claimed ownership of the bag. The officer therefore decided to treat the 
knapsack as abandoned and proceeded to search it. Inside, the officer found 
a loaded handgun. Both young men were then immediately arrested at 
gunpoint. 
In reversing the trial judge’s finding that L.B. had been detained 
“when he was asked for identification and waited for the results of the 
CPIC search”,136 the Court of Appeal relied on Grafe,137 and a handful of 
subsequent judgments,138 that have read that decision as rejecting the 
notion that such requests result in a Charter “detention”.139 Beyond this, 
however, the Court never deals directly with the implications of the request 
for names and identification made in this case, which involved two 
police officers interacting with a couple of 15-year-old boys. Instead, in 
reversing the trial judge’s ruling, the Court indicated: 
 I do not suggest that the respondent did not feel some stress in the 
situation. No doubt, he felt somewhat intimidated by the police given 
the obvious power imbalance that existed. He may also have felt some 
anxiety by reason of the positioning of the police car, the fact that both 
officers got out of the car and the manner in which Officer Reimer 
attempted to prevent him and F from communicating with each other. 
The trial judge quite properly took those factors into account in assessing 
the issue of detention. But respectfully, he went wrong on the legal test. 
In my view, had he applied the correct legal test to the uncontradicted 
evidence of the officers and placed the onus on the respondent, where 
it belonged, he would have found that psychological compulsion had 
not been made out, at least not on a balance of probabilities. In the 
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circumstances, evidence from the respondent was a virtual must, and it 
was not forthcoming.140 
Decisions like Lawrence,141 Grafe142 and B. (L.)143 are difficult to 
reconcile with the realities of how most people would reasonably perceive 
inquisitorial questioning by police officers. Not surprisingly, none of 
these cases reproduce the key passages from Therens,144 wherein Le 
Dain J. recognizes the obvious but important point that: “Most citizens 
are not aware of the precise legal limits of police authority. Rather than risk 
the application of physical force or prosecution for wilful obstruction, 
the reasonable person is likely to err on the side of caution, assume 
lawful authority and comply with the demand.”145 Over the last 20 years 
the cases seem to have drifted away from this realistic view of how most 
reasonable individuals will experience police requests. 
In partial defence of the Ontario Court of Appeal in B. (L.),146 as of 
late the Supreme Court itself has seemed to signal that the time to revisit 
the meaning of “detention” may have arrived. No doubt anticipating the 
impracticality of requiring full compliance with the right to counsel 
found in section 10(b) during investigative detentions, the Supreme Court 
in Mann147 suggested that “the police cannot be said to ‘detain’, within 
the meaning of ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter, every suspect they stop for 
purposes of identification, or even interview.”148 Of course, these comments 
are difficult to square with the Court’s prior decisions that set a relatively 
low bar for “detention”, cases like Therens149 in which rather brief and 
comparatively unobtrusive stops of motorists qualified.150 
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that an applicant’s failure to 
testify that she felt compelled to remain should not be important. In 
marginal cases, where the objective indicators of “detention” are weak, 
the applicant’s failure to testify can quite justifiably provide the decisive 
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factor against finding that there has been a “detention”.151 The difficulty 
is with cases like Lawrence152 and B. (L.),153 where an applicant’s failure 
to testify seems like little more than an excuse for not characterizing an 
encounter as compelled that objectively screams out for a finding of 
“detention”. Take B. (L.) for example. In all seriousness, can it fairly be 
claimed that two teenage boys who are approached by police after a 
police vehicle is spun around and driven toward them for the very 
purpose of intercepting them for questioning, physically separated by 
police, asked to account for their presence in a particular location, asked 
to identify themselves and subjected to a CPIC check, would feel entitled 
to walk away before the police inform them that they are free to do so? 
I do not mean to argue that every time a police officer interacts with 
a member of the public, a section 9 “detention” results. Encounters 
between individuals and the police are rich in their diversity. Most such 
experiences are relatively benign, usually involving nothing more than 
conversation. Such exchanges can become more invasive, however, as 
conversation turns to questioning that increasingly resembles interrogation. 
Coercion can replace consent if a police officer assumes control over  
an individual’s movements through either physical or psychological 
compulsion. In assessing whether an individual has been detained from 
a psychological standpoint, the language used by a police officer will 
usually provide the most obvious clue. If an officer directs an individual 
to “stop” or to “come here” or to even “please come here”, and the target 
of such a demand or direction obeys, the fact that there has been a 
“detention” seems plainly obvious. 
At the same time, it is also important to recognize that a great many 
coercive encounters between the police and members of the public are 
far subtler, but nevertheless just as compelled. Beyond the legal powers 
that accompany a police officer’s status, there are also the physical signs 
of his or her authority, the uniform, the baton and the gun. With very 
little effort, a police officer can use these symbols of authority to create 
an atmosphere of compulsion without ever making any overt “demand” 
or issuing an express “direction”. A police officer’s tone of voice, body 
language and physical positioning can communicate to an individual 
that he or she is not free to leave just as effectively as any authoritative 
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command or direction. In other words, a police officer’s “direction” can 
come in the form of a stern look and a raised finger that would make 
plain, both to the subject and anyone who happens to be watching, that 
non-compliance is simply not an option. 
No doubt, there is much deliberate ambiguity that marks a great many 
police and citizen interactions. Leaving an individual’s legal status less 
than clear works to the benefit of the police, who are able to advance their 
inquiries relatively free from concern that their actions will subsequently 
be characterized as resulting in a “detention” and therefore run afoul of 
section 9 should a court later conclude that they lacked the legal grounds 
to detain at the time. Avoiding a “detention” also brings with it the added 
benefit of not engaging the informational duties created by subsections 
10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter. For example, an individual who is told in 
express terms why he or she is being detained may very well decide to 
stop talking, thereby scuttling police efforts to quickly get to the bottom 
of things. 
Our current approach in deciding whether or not a police-citizen 
encounter is sufficiently coercive to constitute a “detention” leaves the 
police much room to navigate their difficult responsibilities. It must be 
frankly acknowledged, however, that at the same time it does very little 
to protect individuals from unjustified state interferences with their liberty. 
The purpose of section 9 seems conspicuously absent from the analytical 
approach currently employed by Canadian courts in deciding whether or 
not an individual was “detained”. 
If protecting individuals from unjustified state intrusions on freedom of 
movement is our actual goal, an approach that openly acknowledges and 
accounts for the profound power disparity that exists between the police 
and most individuals seems far more appropriate. 
When an individual remains in the presence of the police while 
questions are being posed, he or she should be truly choosing to do so. 
Allowing such encounters to remain steeped in uncertainty may do a 
great deal to facilitate the important functions of law enforcement, but 
does very little to ensure that such encounters are truly voluntary. 
In the context of search and seizure, our courts have demonstrated a 
clear reluctance to characterize an individual’s acquiescence to police 
authority as truly “consensual” unless the individual said to be consenting 
is aware of the right to refuse and is also aware of the potential 
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consequences of giving up the right.154 This high standard for waiver 
does not necessarily impose an informational duty on law enforcement. 
It does mean, however, that factual ambiguity surrounding the 
circumstances of a “consent” search will often mean that the waiver of 
the right will be considered wanting. As a result, if the police wish to 
ensure that “consent” is subsequently determined to be valid they will 
take the time to inform the target of his or her right to refuse. 
In stark contrast, ambiguity about an individual’s right to walk away 
has tended to weigh against a finding of “detention”. If a purposive 
reading of section 9 is what the Charter actually requires,155 then a 
different approach to evaluating whether or not an encounter between an 
individual and the police qualifies as a “detention” seems in order. If we 
truly want to protect individuals from unjustified state interferences with 
their liberty, then the police should be expected to make clear to 
individuals the true nature of their interactions. 
I do not mean to suggest that police officers should be required to 
preface every interaction with members of the public with a formal legal 
caution, for example, by explaining that “it is my duty to inform you 
that you have the right to walk away”. Nevertheless, police officers 
should be expected to use language that makes clear to those with whom 
they are interacting when an interaction is in fact voluntary. If a police 
officer fails to use permissive language that would make apparent the 
option to refuse156 or says nothing at all, then the subject’s acquiescence 
should be characterized for what it most probably is: compelled, a 
“detention” for Charter purposes. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although the Charter has led to many positive changes within the 
Canadian criminal justice system, section 9 has so far proven to be an 
unfortunate exception. The key concepts that are central to the protection 
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afforded by this constitutional guarantee, the meaning of “detention” 
and “arbitrarily” have both been steeped in considerable confusion. 
The source of that confusion would seem to be the absence of a 
seminal judgment interpreting the guarantee from our Supreme Court. 
Because of this, the purpose of section 9 has never consciously formed a 
part of how the guarantee has been read. The result has been a rather 
legalistic approach, with lower courts interpreting and applying its two 
key terms (“detention” and “arbitrarily”) in an extraordinarily narrow and 
restrictive fashion. 
A purposive approach to the interpretation of the guarantee reveals 
that its object is relatively straightforward: protecting the individual 
from unjustified state interference with his or her liberty. Realizing the 
potential of section 9 depends on revisiting how its key terms are read in 
light of that overarching objective. 
First, a purposive reading of “arbitrarily” would seem to dictate that 
any unlawful interference with individual liberty should be considered 
arbitrary and a violation of section 9. To the extent that this might result 
in violations of section 9 based on minor or technical breaches of the law, 
the appropriate place to deal with such mitigating circumstances would 
seem to be section 24(2). The time has come to recognize that under our 
constitutional system, legal authority is an essential precondition for any 
interference with individual liberty. The flipside of this long-standing 
constitutional requirement is that when liberty is interfered with in the 
absence of legal authority, the detention that results is necessarily 
unconstitutional. 
In addition, we must also begin to recognize that the important 
purpose of section 9 is not served when uncertainty about an individual’s 
status is allowed to control the constitutional outcome. If we are going 
to take seriously the right to be free from unjustified state interference with 
our liberty, then we must begin to insist on greater clarity in encounters 
between citizens and police. Ambiguous encounters should be labelled just 
as Justice Le Dain suggested, for what they most likely are, “detentions”. 
 
